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Abstract
Climate policies vary widely across countries, with some countries imposing stringent emissions policies and others doing very little. When climate
policies vary across countries, energy-intensive industries have an incentive
to relocate to places with few or no emissions restrictions, an effect known
as leakage. Relocated industries would continue to pollute but would be
operating in a less desirable location. We consider solutions to the leakage
problem in a simple setting where one region of the world imposes a climate
policy and the rest of the world is passive. We solve the model analytically and also calibrate and simulate the model. Our model and analysis
imply: (1) optimal climate policies tax both the supply of fossil fuels and
the demand for fossil fuels; (2) on the demand side, absent administrative
costs, optimal policies would tax both the use of fossil fuels in domestic
production and the domestic consumption of goods created with fossil fuels,
but with the tax rate on production lower due to leakage; (3) taxing only
production (on the demand side), however, would be substantially simpler,
and almost as effective as taxing both production and consumption, because
it would avoid the need for border adjustments on imports of goods; (4)
the effectiveness of the latter strategy depends on a low foreign elasticity
of energy supply, which means that forming a taxing coalition to ensure a
low foreign elasticity of energy supply can act as a substitute for border
adjustments on goods.
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Introduction

If nations adopt different prices on greenhouse gases, industries have an incentive
to relocate where carbon prices are low. The result, known as leakage, is an
increase in emissions in low-tax countries, undermining the efficacy of climate
change policies while at the same time distorting the location of production.
Concerns about leakage have been central to the design of carbon policies in the
United States, the European Union, and other regions of the world.
The most common response to leakage is to impose what are known as carbon
border adjustments or more simply border adjustments. Border adjustments
combine taxes on the emissions associated with imports and rebates of prior taxes
paid for exports. They shift the tax downstream, for example, from emissions from
domestic production to emissions associated with domestic consumption. They are
thought to help insulate the tax from leakage because, with border adjustments,
the tax would be the same regardless of the location of production. Every carbon
tax bill introduced in the current Congress includes border adjustments. The
European Union has proposed a version for its cap and trade system. Border
adjustments have also been subject to significant study. (For a recent review of
the literature, see Böhringer et al (2022).)
Notwithstanding their prominence, it is still not clear whether, or the extent
to which, border adjustments are effective, and how they compare to alternative
approaches. To answer this question, we consider the design of a carbon tax in a
simple setting where one region of the world imposes a carbon policy and the rest
of the world does not. The taxing region sets policies to address climate change
while taking into account the possibility of leakage. We solve the model to find
the optimal (i.e., most efficient) choices for the taxing region, constraining those
choices to fit with commonly proposed policies.1 We also calibrate the model and
simulate various policies to get a sense of the size of the effects.
We get the following results.
(1) The most efficient policy imposes the tax on both the supply and the demand
for fossil fuels. The usual result in taxation is that in the absence of avoidance, or
1
The approach builds on but simplifies the analysis in Kortum and Weisbach (2021). Two
key differences are: (1) this paper restricts the set of policies that the taxing region can impose
to those that are similar to existing or proposed policies while Kortum and Weisbach find
the unrestricted optimal policy and (2) because we restrict choices to simpler policies, some
restrictions on the model in Kortum and Weisbach (2021) can be relaxed.
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evasion, the legal incidence of a tax doesn’t alter its economic effects. As a result,
in the absence of trade (or if the tax were global), a carbon tax could be imposed
entirely upstream on extractors to minimize administrative costs, as suggested
by Metcalf and Weisbach (2009). With trade and the possibility of leakage, this
result no longer holds.
In particular, carbon taxes are commonly imposed on the use of fossil fuels in
production or on the implicit consumption of fossil fuels embodied in goods, but
in both cases, on the demand for fossil fuels. Taxes on the demand for fossil fuels
lower their global price, inducing an increase in their use or consumption abroad.
Taxes on the extraction of fossil fuels, that is, on their supply, by contrast, raise
their global price, inducing an increase in extraction abroad. Our first result is
that the optimal policy combines taxes on supply and demand, so that these
effects offset, allowing the taxing region to control responses in the rest of the
world.2
Incorporating this principle into the design of carbon taxes involves an almost
trivial adjustment to current proposals yet offers potentially enormous gains in
terms of the effectiveness of the tax. Many current carbon tax bills impose the
tax nominally on extraction. They then impose border adjustments on energy
(that is taxes on the imports of fossil fuels and rebate of taxes paid on exports
of fossil fuels) at the same tax rate, to shift the tax downstream to domestic
production.3 If the border adjustments on energy were imposed at a lower rate
than the nominal extraction tax, a portion of the tax would remain on extraction
instead of being shifted downstream. Our simulations here show that this minor
2
This result was implicit in the seminal paper of Markusen (1975). Contributions by Hoel
(1994), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014), and Balistreri, Kaffine, and Yonezawa (2019) develop
the idea in the context of carbon taxes and carbon border adjustments. Nonetheless, it does
not appear to have been incorporated into the design of carbon taxes. In fact, we are not
aware of any carbon taxes (or cap and trade systems) that incorporate this principle. One
possible explanation is that the models in those papers were restrictive. In particular, those
papers assumed an economy with extraction and direct consumption of fossil fuels, such as
for transportation or residential heating. They did not include a manufacturing or production
sector of the economy. Leakage concerns, however, are largely focused on the production of
goods. We show that the result applies in a more general economy with production and the
possibility of leakage due to shifts in the location of production.
3
H.R. 2307, The Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2021, is a typical example.
It imposes a tax on oil refineries, coal mines, and any entity entering natural gas into the natural
gas transmission system. In addition, importers of oil, coal, or natural gas must pay an import
tariff, and exporters of these fuels receive a rebate of prior taxes paid. Both the import tariff
and the export rebate are at the same rate as the underlying tax.
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change has the potential to dramatically improve the effectiveness of the tax in
reducing global emissions.
While this hybrid policy—combining a tax on extraction and a demand-side
tax—is always desirable to maximize the efficiency of the tax, there remains the
question of how to impose the demand-side tax. Should it be on production,
consumption, or some combination?
(2) On the demand side, to maximize efficiency, impose taxes on both production
and consumption. Our second result is that in the absence of administrative costs,
imposing the tax both on emissions from domestic production and on emissions
associated with domestic consumption maximizes the efficiency of unilateral carbon
taxes when there is trade. The tax rate on production, however, should be lower
than the tax rate on consumption to address concerns about leakage. If leakage is
zero, the tax rate on production should equal the tax rate on consumption. If
leakage is 100%, the tax rate on production should be zero.
This result answers the widely posed question of whether border adjustments
should include export rebates in addition to import tariffs.4 In particular, to
implement this set of taxes, the taxing region starts with a nominal extraction tax
and shifts part of it downstream to production by imposing border adjustments on
imports and exports of energy (at a lower rate than the nominal extraction tax).
To shift the tax further downstream to consumption, the taxing region imposes
border taxes on imports of goods at the same rate as the border adjustments
on energy. The corresponding rebate on exports of goods, which removes taxes
on domestic production for goods sold abroad, is lower than the import tariff,
leaving some part of the tax on domestic production. The rebate on export is not
typically zero, however, because of the possibility of leakage. We show that the
rebate on exports in fact scales linearly with leakage. If leakage were zero there
would be no rebate on exports while if leakage were 100 percent there would be a
full rebate (i.e., at the same rate as the border adjustment on imports).
(3) Administrative costs may make border adjustments on goods prohibitively
4
The European Union’s proposed Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) would
require importers of carbon intensive goods to purchase emission permits, but wouldn’t rebate
the permit cost for production of goods for export. In our analysis this policy (no rebates on
exports) would be justified if there is little leakage due to customers outside of the European
Union substituting away from EU exports. In contrast, H.R. 2307 (described in footnote 3)
would provide full export rebates on carbon-intensive goods subject to border adjustments. In
our analysis, this policy (full rebates on exports) would be justified if there is 100% leakage due
to customers outside of the United States substituting away from US exports.
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expensive. Administrative costs may outweigh the efficiency benefits of imposing
taxes on both production and consumption. The key reason is that to impose
taxes on emissions associated with domestic consumption, the taxing region must
impose border adjustments on imports of goods. As discussed in Kortum and
Weisbach (2017), doing so will be complex and expensive. Imposing a tax only on
domestic production only requires border adjustments on imports and exports
of energy, not goods. Border adjustments on energy are simple to impose. As
a result, a tax on extraction and emissions from production is much simpler to
impose than a tax on extraction and emissions associated with consumption.
Our simulations show that a combination of a tax on extraction and production
often performs nearly as well as a tax on extraction and consumption. The
gains from imposing border adjustments on goods is small. The key reason our
simulations differ from those in the prior literature, which show modest but
noticeable gains from border adjustments on goods, is that we simulate taxes on
production and consumption as hybrid taxes that also include a tax on extraction
(point (1) above) while the prior literature does not simulate hybrid systems. If
the benefits from imposing border adjustments on goods is small, combining just
a tax on extraction and a tax on domestic production may be the best policy.
The key parameter in this comparison is the foreign elasticity of energy supply.
If this parameter is low, the combination of an extraction and production tax
performs almost as well as taxes that also fall on consumption. If, however, the
foreign elasticity of energy supply is high, the simpler combination of an extraction
and production tax no longer performs well. In this case, shifting a portion of the
tax downstream to consumption, via border adjustments on goods, may be worth
consideration notwithstanding the administrative costs.
(4) Ensuring that countries with a high elasticity of energy supply are in the
taxing coalition may allow the use of a simpler tax system with fewer efficiency
losses. Building on point (3), one way to improve the effectiveness of the tax
without having to impose border adjustments on goods is to ensure that the
foreign elasticity of energy supply is low. To do this, the taxing coalition can
work to include countries with a high elasticity of energy supply. In effect, this
strategy—including countries with a high elasticity of energy supply in the taxing
coalition—acts as a substitute for border adjustments.
We develop these results in four parts. Section 2 presents a model where
individuals directly consume fossil fuels (for example, for transportation and
4

residential heating), to illustrate the logic of combining taxes on supply and
demand. Section 3 introduces trade in goods to allow us to study leakage. It
shows that the results from Section 2 carry over to this more realistic setting and
shows how the various demand-side policies compare to one another. Section 4
provides our numerical simulations. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.

2

Trade in Energy but Not Goods

We start by reviewing and extending the theory of optimal carbon policy in
a two-region world where energy is used directly in consumption, such as for
transportation or residential heating, but is not embodied in traded goods. This
case provides intuition for why efficient carbon policies act on both the supply
and the demand side of the energy market. The same intuition carries over to
the more general case. The setting is similar to Hoel (1994). In Section 3 we
introduce traded goods that are produced in either country with energy as an
input, which allows us to consider leakage.

2.1

Graphical Intuitions

To develop intuitions, we use a graphical illustration of how domestic taxes affect
trade. We assume that there are two regions of the world, Home and Foreign, that
extract fossil fuel energy in quantities Qe and Q∗e and directly consume quantities
Ce and Ce∗ (a * indicates Foreign). Home imposes a carbon policy while Foreign
is passive. (In the figures that follow, we draw supply and demand intersecting at
the same price for Home and Foreign.)
The left hand panel of Figure 1 shows the conventional supply and demand
diagram for a good, here fossil fuel energy, and a tax, tc , imposed on consumers.
The interpretation is, equivalently, that the taxing region is the entire world
or that there is no trade between the taxing region and the rest of the world
(autarky). The tax creates a wedge between the amount consumers pay, pe + tc ,
and the amount sellers (here extractors of energy) receive, pe . The equilibrium sets
Qe = Ce given the wedge between extractors and consumers. As is conventional,
in autarky it doesn’t matter if the tax is imposed on extractors or consumers
because the wedge between the two would be the same regardless.
If there is trade in energy, illustrated by the right hand panel of Figure 1, we
5

can see that pe can’t be an equilibrium. If the price of energy goes down from p0
to pe , Foreign extractors would extract less energy while Foreign consumers would
demand more, generating a net demand for Home exports, a demand which can’t
be met if Qe = Ce .

Figure 1

Figure 1: Autarky
Home

pe  t c
p0
pe

Foreign

p0

tc

Qe  C e

Qe*  Ce*

Figure 2 shows the equilibrium that would arise if Home taxes the consumption
of energy and trades with Foreign. The price of energy, pe , would still go down
relative to the price without a tax, but it would go down less than it would in
autarky. The lower price of energy would induce excess demand, Xe = Ce∗ − Q∗e ,
in Foreign (though less than illustrated in Figure 1), but Home would now have
excess supply Ce < Qe at the equilibrium price. The price of energy would go
down just enough that Home’s excess supply, Xe = Qe − Ce , matches Foreign’s
excess demand. At that price, global supply, Qe + Q∗e , equals global demand,
Ce + Ce∗ .
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium if Home instead chooses to tax extractors,
imposing a tax of te instead of tc at the same rate. The logic is the same as with
the consumption tax except now the price of energy seen by Foreign extractors
goes up. Foreign consumers demand less energy while Foreign extractors produce
more, resulting in excess supply in Foreign. To be in equilibrium, the price of
energy goes up less than it would in autarky, inducing excess demand in Home
(Ce > Qe ). In equilibrium, the price of energy adjusts so that Home’s excess
demand equals Foreign’s excess supply.
6

Figure 2: Trade with a consumption tax
Home
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Figure 3: Trade with an extraction tax
Home

Foreign

Common price of energy

pe
te
pe-te
Xe

Imports

Qe Ce

Xe
Ce* Qe*

The question, which we address immediately below, is how Home optimizes in
this situation. As we will show, rather than choosing either a pure consumption
tax or a pure extraction tax, Home mixes the two, which allows it to better control
responses in Foreign.
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2.2

Basic Model

To formalize the problem illustrated in Section 2.1, continue to assume that there
are two regions, Home, which implements a carbon policy, and Foreign, which is
passive. Home and Foreign are endowed with labor, L and L∗ . They both extract
carbon-based energy and trade it at price pe . The labor required to extract a
quantity of energy Qe in Home is c(Qe ) while to extract Q∗e in Foreign requires
c∗ (Q∗e ). Both c and c∗ are strictly increasing, convex, and differentiable functions.
A numeraire good, which we call services, is produced one-for-one with labor and is
traded at price 1. Consumption of services in the two regions is constrained by the
labor available to produce them, Cs + Cs∗ = L + L∗ − c(Qe ) − c∗ (Q∗e ). Consumption
of energy is constrained by global extraction of energy, Ce + Ce∗ = Qe + Q∗e = QW
e .
We choose units so that global carbon emissions equal global extraction, E = QW
e .
∗
Welfare in the two regions, U and U , depends positively on consumption
of goods and services and negatively on global emissions. To keep the analysis
transparent we assume that welfare is additively separable:
U = Cs + u(Ce ) − φE
U ∗ = Cs∗ + u∗ (Ce∗ ) − φ∗ E,
where u and u∗ are strictly increasing, concave, and differentiable functions.
(Appendix A.2 shows that our key result, equation (2) below, holds without the
assumption of additive separability.) We treat φW = φ + φ∗ as the marginal
global social cost of carbon.
Foreign’s energy supply curve, Q∗e (pe ), satisfies c∗′ (Q∗e (pe )) = pe , with slope
∗
∗′
∗
Q∗′
e > 0. Foreign’s energy demand curve, Ce (pe ), satisfies u (Ce (pe )) = pe , with
slope Ce∗′ < 0. (Derivatives appear as f ′ = df /dx.) Thus if pe increases, Foreign
extraction rises and Foreign consumption falls. Home indirectly influences Foreign
extraction and consumption by manipulating the global price of energy through
its carbon policy. If Home reduces Ce the energy price declines while if it reduces
Qe the energy price rises. We can think of Home as choosing pe rather than
choosing Qe and Ce .
Following Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014), we assume that Home can’t adopt
policies that make Foreign worse off. All policies must be Pareto improvements.
This approach eliminates terms-of-trade considerations and, in addition, helps
motivate the assumption that Foreign remains passive. Within the model, it
8

requires that Home transfer services to keep Foreign welfare at a threshold Ū ∗ .
With that transfer Foreign can consume services:
Cs∗ (pe , E) = Ū ∗ + φ∗ E − u∗ (Ce∗ (pe )).
The particular value of Ū ∗ doesn’t enter into our formulas for efficient policies.
(Appendix B shows what changes if we replace this constraint on Foreign welfare
with a trade-balance constraint.)
We break the problem into two parts. First, Home chooses its carbon policy
to meet an arbitrary global emissions goal, Ē. Later, Home optimizes its choice
of Ē. Home focuses on global emissions rather than domestic emissions because
the harm is the same regardless of the source of emissions. Because of this focus
it takes leakage into account, as we will see in the following section.5
For a fixed global emissions goal, Home’s optimal policy is the solution to:
max Cs + u(Ce ) − φĒ,
pe

subject to labor market clearing and energy market clearing:
Cs = L + L∗ − c(Ē − Q∗e (pe )) − c∗ (Q∗e (pe )) − Cs∗ (pe , Ē)
Ce = Ē − Ce∗ (pe ).
The first-order condition implies:6
′
∗′
(pe − c′ )Q∗′
e = (u − pe )|Ce |.

(1)

(The absolute value on the slope of Foreign demand makes all terms positive.)
To interpret this equation, define the extraction wedge as the difference between
5

In the Paris Agreement, nations set domestic emissions goals rather than global goals, but
the joint aim was to produce a global goal. One of the problems with the Paris structure is that
it creates an incentive to offshore emissions because doing so makes it easier for a nation to
meet is stated emissions goal.
6
Substituting the two constraints into Home’s objective function, along with the expression
for Cs∗ (pe , Ē), and then differentiating with respect to pe , the first-order condition is:
∗′ ∗′
∗′ ∗′
′ ∗′
c′ Q∗′
e − c Qe + u Ce − u Ce = 0.

Applying the competitive-market conditions in Foreign, c∗′ = u∗′ = pe , the first-order condition
reduces to (1).
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the marginal cost of extracting energy in Foreign and Home, pe − c′ , and the
consumption wedge as the difference between the marginal value of consuming
energy in Home and Foreign, u′ − pe . A higher extraction wedge, corresponding to
lower Qe , raises the energy price while a higher consumption wedge, corresponding
to lower Ce , reduces the energy price. Either wedge represents a global inefficiency.
The optimal balance is for Home to equate the product of the price response of
Foreign extraction and the extraction wedge to the product of the price response
of Foreign consumption (in absolute value) and the consumption wedge. In this
way Home minimizes the global inefficiency due to its inability to separately set
Foreign extraction and consumption. Crucially, both wedges must be positive
since Foreign supply is increasing and Foreign demand is decreasing in the energy
price.
This condition will be satisfied with a combination of taxes in Home: an
extraction tax equal to the extraction wedge and a consumption tax equal to
the consumption wedge. Since both wedges are positive so are both taxes: it is
optimal for Home to tax both the demand side and the supply side of the energy
market. Rearranging equation (1), the relative tax rates satisfy:
te
|C ∗′ |
= e∗′ .
tc
Qe

(2)

Equation (2) has a standard elasticity-type explanation, which is that Home wants
to avoid taxes on highly responsive items. A tax on the the demand for energy,
tc , lowers the energy price seen in Foreign, causing Foreign demand to go up. The
more responsive Foreign demand is to the price of energy, the lower the tax on
domestic consumption. Similarly, a tax on domestic extraction increases the price
of energy in Foreign, causing an increase in extraction there. The more responsive
Foreign supply is to the price of energy, the lower the tax on domestic extraction.
The optimal ratio of the taxes balances these concerns.7
7

Variations on the figures from the previous subsection illustrate the advantage of following
this principle in two extreme cases. The first case is a vertical Foreign demand curve (|Ce∗′ | = 0),
so that Foreign consumption Ce∗ is fixed. Equation (2) implies that a pure consumption tax is
optimal in this case. Sure enough, the after-tax price is higher in Figure 2 than in Figure 1,
resulting in lower Ce and hence lower global emissions with trade (under this optimal policy)
than in autarky. The second case is a vertical Foreign supply curve (Q∗′
e = 0), so that Foreign
extraction Q∗e is fixed. Equation (2) implies that a pure extraction tax is optimal in this case.
Sure enough, the after-tax price is lower in Figure 3 than in Figure 1, resulting in lower Qe
and hence lower global emissions with trade (under this optimal policy) than in autarky. It is

10

If Home optimizes Ē, the sum of the taxes equals the marginal global social
cost of carbon: te + tc = φW .8 Home’s taxes satisfy its part of the optimality
condition for a globally harmonized tax (see Appendix A.1) even though Foreign
doesn’t tax carbon. The individual taxes are then:
|Ce∗′ |
∗′
Q∗′
e + |Ce |
Q∗′
tc = φW ∗′ e ∗′ ,
Qe + |Ce |

te = φW

(3)

with their sum equal to the global social cost of carbon φW and their ratio
satisfying (2). The intuitions for these values are the same as for Equation (2).
Looking at the expression for te , the higher Q∗′
e , the lower the value of te . Similarly,
∗′
the higher the value of |Ce |, the lower the value of tc .9
Figure 4 illustrates. Equation (2) requires that the consumption tax multiplied
by the slope of Foreign’s demand curve equal the extraction tax multiplied by
the slope of Foreign’s supply curve. The height of each rectangle is the tax. The
ratio of the widths is equal to the ratio of the slopes of the supply and demand
′
10
curves, Q∗′
At
e and |Ce | (with pe on the y axis, slopes are read off the x axis).
the optimum, the mix of te and tc is set so that the size of the two rectangles are
the same, as shown in Figure 4. Because we drew supply steeper than demand,
′
i.e. Q∗′
e < |Ce |, the optimal extraction tax in this illustration exceeds the optimal
consumption tax.
easy to see that contradicting (2), by applying a pure extraction tax in the first case or a pure
consumption tax in the second, would yield smaller reductions in global emissions (even smaller
than than under autarky.
8
Substituting the two constraints into Home’s objective function and then differentiating
with respect to Ē, the first-order condition is:
−c′ − φ∗ + u′ − ϕ = (pe − c′ ) + (u′ − pe ) − φW = 0.
9

These results change in two ways if we replace the Foreign welfare constraint with trade
∗′
balance (see Appendix B). First, equation (2) becomes te Q∗′
e = tc |Ce | + Xe . When Home’s net
exports of energy, Xe = Qe − Ce , are higher, it relies more on the extraction tax in order to
improve its terms of trade. Second, Home’s optimal emissions goal now implies that te + tc
equals φ rather than φW . Home no longer considers the marginal social cost of emissions in
Foreign.
10
This is because the widths are the base of the triangles underneath the supply and demand
curves, above pe − te , and centered on the intersection of supply and demand.

11

Figure 4: Optimal extraction and consumption taxes
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2.3

Policy Implementation

The taxes described in (2) and (3) are effective taxes. As noted, current carbon tax
bills in the United States often begin with a nominal tax τ on domestic extraction.
They then impose taxes on US energy imports and rebate prior taxes paid on US
energy exports, which we call border adjustments on energy and denote by βe .
Border adjustments on energy shift the nominal tax τ on extraction downstream.
In the present model, with no manufacturing sector, border adjustments on energy
shift the tax all the way downstream to consumption.11
Current carbon tax bills set βe = τ so that they shift the entire tax downstream,
setting the effective tax on extraction to zero. The basic model here says that’s not
optimal. To get to the optimal policy Home should impose the border adjustments
on energy at a lower rate than the underlying extraction tax, i.e. βe < τ . A partial
border adjustment shifts only a portion of the tax downstream to consumption.
To implement the optimal effective taxes te and tc in (3) Home would impose a
nominal extraction tax at rate τ = te + tc = φW and border adjustments at rate
11

If we add goods production, as we do in Section 3, border adjustments on energy only shift
the tax to producers. As we discuss in Section 3.5, in that case border adjustments on goods
are needed to shift the tax to consumption.

12

βe = tc on energy imports and exports. This strategy of a nominal tax and border
adjustments leaves the optimal effective tax on extraction at rate te = τ − βe .

2.4

Policy Coordination

Up to this point we have treated the Foreign region as passive. It has no carbon
taxes and doesn’t consider introducing any when Home imposes them. We now
consider the optimal policy for Home if Foreign already has carbon taxes. We
continue to assume that Foreign is strategically passive; it doesn’t adjust its tax
rates in response to Home’s policy.
Let t∗e be Foreign’s extraction tax, t∗c its consumption tax, and φ̃∗ the sum of
the two. Home’s optimal policy, including its optimal emissions goal, turns out to
be a simple generalization of (3):12
|Ce∗′ |
∗′
Q∗′
e + |Ce |
Q∗′
− φ̃∗ ) ∗′ e ∗′ .
Qe + |Ce |

te = t∗e + (φW − φ̃∗ )
tc =

t∗c

+ (φ

W

(4)

Home’s optimal tax rates mimic the tax rates in Foreign with an adjustment
based on the differences in the overall level of carbon taxation in Home and
Foreign, φW − φ̃∗ . This adjustment is optimally split between Home’s extraction
tax and its consumption tax, in the same ratio as (2). If it happens that Foreign
chooses φ̃∗ = φW then Home simply matches the tax rates of Foreign and the
global optimum, with harmonized taxes, is obtained (as in Appendix A.1).
Implementing these policies, whether harmonized or not, is simple. Foreign
imposes a nominal tax on extraction at rate φ̃∗ with a border adjustment on its
imports and exports of energy at rate βe∗ = t∗c . Likewise, Home imposes a nominal
tax on extraction at rate φW with a border adjustment on its imports and exports
of energy at rate βe = tc , where tc is given by the second equation in (4).
12

The first-order condition for Home’s optimal global energy price, from footnote 6, is
unchanged. But now the competitive-market conditions in Foreign are c∗′ = pe − t∗e and
u∗′ = pe + t∗c . Combining these results with Home’s competitive-market conditions (c′ = pe − te
and u′ = pe + tc ) gives:
∗
∗′
(t∗e − te )Q∗′
e + (tc − tc )Ce = 0.
The first-order condition for Home’s optimal emissions goal, from footnote 8, is also unchanged
so that te + tc = φW (while t∗e + t∗c = φ̃∗ ). Substituting in these results, the equation above can
be solved for te and tc as in (4).
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3

Trade in Energy and Goods

A key concern for unilateral carbon taxes is how those taxes affect the location
of production. In particular, a unilateral carbon tax on production might cause
production, and the resulting emissions, to shift offshore, an effect known as leakage.
The basic model in Part 2, however, had only extraction and consumption of
energy. It did not include the use of energy in production of traded goods.
We now extend the model to include production in both regions. The production sector in each region manufactures tradable final goods using carbon-based
energy. Goods are produced with varying levels of efficiency in different locations
using a combination of labor and energy. They are traded based on Ricardian
comparative advantage. Taxes on production alter the regions’ comparative
advantage, generating leakage.
In Kortum and Weisbach (2021) we derive the optimal carbon policy for Home
in such a setting, without restricting the choices available to Home. Here, in
order to connect directly with current policy proposals, we restrict Home to
particular combinations of taxes: (i) the optimal combination of an extraction and
consumption tax, (ii) the optimal combination of an extraction and production
tax, and (iii) the optimal combination of all three. Some of the structure in
our earlier analysis isn’t relevant for these simpler policies, so we leave it out.
(Appendix D brings back the structural assumptions, which are used in the
numerical illustrations of Section 4.)

3.1

Model Structure

We retain the welfare expressions from the basic model, but replace utility from
consuming carbon-based energy with utility from consuming goods, both domestically produced and imported.13 These goods embody the energy used in their
production in either Home or Foreign.
To trace and possibly tax emissions from production and the implicit emissions
associated with consumption, we denote the implicit consumption of energy
embodied in goods as Ce with a superscript denoting the source of the good
and the location of consumption: Ced is energy in goods produced domestically
13

To keep this extended model tractable we drop the direct consumption of energy underlying
the basic model. Retaining energy consumed directly (together with energy used to produce
tradable goods) would be a useful extension to the quantitative illustrations in Section 4.
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Table 1: Carbon Matrix, OECD, 2015
Home

Foreign

Total

Home

Ced = 11.3 Cem = 2.5

Foreign

Cex = 0.9

Cef = 17.6 Ce∗ = 18.5

Total

Ge = 12.2

G∗e = 20.1

CeW = 32.3

Q∗e =23.7

QW
e = 32.3

Extraction Qe = 8.6

Ce = 13.8

Units: gigatons of CO2 .

and consumed domestically, Cem is energy in goods Home imports, Cex is energy
in goods Home exports, and Cef is energy in goods Foreign both produces and
consumes. The total quantity of energy associated with goods consumed in Home
is Ce = Ced + Cem . Similarly Ce∗ = Cef + Cex . We can also account for all energy
used in producing goods in Home, Ge = Ced + Cex and in Foreign G∗e = Cef + Cem .
Table 1 shows how these values relate to one another, with rows showing
emissions by location of consumption and columns by location of production.
Table 1 shows the values for the year 2015 under the assumption that Home is
the OECD.14 As we will discuss in Section 4, we use these values to calibrate
our model for simulation. Global emissions in 2015 were 32.3 GtCO2 and of
that, the OECD emitted 12.2 GtCO2 . Most of that, 11.3 GtCO2 was consumed
domestically. The OECD imported 2.5 GtCO2 so that it consumed 13.8 GtCO2 .
In the basic model of Section 2.2 we started with a planner in Home setting
quantities (implicitly via its choice of pe and explicitly via its choice of Ē). Here
we directly model a competitive market economy with a policy maker choosing
tax rates. In addition to an extraction tax, te , we will need to consider three
demand-side taxes corresponding to the three sources of demand that Home can
influence through its taxes: (i) a tax td on the energy Ced used to produce goods in
Home for the domestic market, (ii) a tax tm on the energy Cem used to produce the
goods Home imports, and (iii) a tax tx on the energy Cex used to produce Home
exports. The consumption tax considered in Section 3.2 restricts td = tm = tc
and tx = 0. The production tax considered in Section 3.3 restricts td = tx = tp
14

Table 1 corresponds to Table 5 in Kortum and Weisbach (2021). The source is the Trade in
Embodied CO2 database made available by the OECD (2019).
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and tm = 0. The combination of all three taxes considered in Section 3.4 removes
these restrictions, allowing arbitrary combinations of production and consumption
taxes.
Note that these taxes are effective taxes. While effective taxes are unique,
there are a number of different ways to implement them. In particular, instead of
directly imposing the effective taxes, Home could start with a nominal extraction
tax and impose border adjustments on imports and exports of energy and of
goods. Various combinations of border adjustments produce each of the policies
we consider. We defer the discussion of implementation to Section 3.5, and here
work with effective taxes.
Because we are working with prices and taxes, it is convenient to use indirect
utility functions, which give the maximum welfare that a region can attain given
spending and prices. Those prices are the effective cost of the energy embedded
in the goods that are consumed. They are given by pde = pe + td , pm
e = pe + t m ,
x
f
15
pe = pe + tx , and pe = pe . Production and trade in services means wages (and
the price of services) are 1 in both regions.
Exploiting the separability assumptions of the basic model, welfare becomes:
U = Y + ũ(pde , pm
e ) − φE
U ∗ = Y ∗ + ũ∗ (pfe , pxe ) − φ∗ E.
The tilde on ũ and ũ∗ distinguishes indirect utility from direct utility u and u∗ in
the basic model. Here Y and Y ∗ represent the levels of spending in Home and
Foreign.
Spending in each region comes from labor income, rents to the energy sector,
tax revenue, and transfers (from Home to Foreign): Y = L + Re + Rt − T and
Y ∗ = L∗ + Re∗ + Rt∗ + T . Home’s tax revenue is Rt = te Qe + td Ced + tm Cem + tx Cex .
We usually assume that Foreign has no carbon policy so gets no tax revenue,
Rt∗ = 0. (We relax that assumption in Section 3.6.) Rents to the energy sector in
Home are Re = (pe − te )Qe − c(Qe ) while in Foreign Re∗ = pe Q∗e − c∗ (Q∗e ). As in
the basic model, we assume that the level of transfers keep Foreign welfare at Ū ∗ ,
so T = Ū ∗ + φ∗ E − ũ∗ (pfe , pxe ) − L∗ − Re∗ .
15

The carbon tax that Home imposes on imports indirectly raises the cost of energy for
producers in Foreign serving consumers in Home. Foreign producers purchase energy at price pe ,
but they anticipate that to sell goods in Home they will pay the tax tm for each unit of energy
they use. Their effective cost of energy is thus pm
e = pe + tm .
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Substituting these sources of spending into Home welfare and dropping constants, Home’s objective is to choose taxes that maximize the objective:
∗ f
x
W
L = Re + Re∗ + Rt + ũ(pde , pm
e ) + ũ (pe , pe ) − φ E.

(5)

16
Recall that global emissions equal global extraction, E = QW
In solving this
e .
maximization problem, the policy maker accounts for how its choice of taxes
affects the energy price and quantities of energy supplied and demanded in the
global energy market. (When there is no ambiguity, we denote the response of
any variable y to the energy price by y ′ = ∂y/∂pe .)

3.2

Taxing Extraction and Consumption

Our first application of this model is to solve for the optimal combination of an
extraction tax te and a consumption tax tc . Under a consumption tax pde = pm
e =
f
x
pe + tc for goods consumed in Home and pe = pe = pe for goods consumed in
Foreign, no matter where they are produced.
Home maximizes the objective L in (5) by choosing te and tc (the full derivation
is in Appendix C.1). Taking the first-order conditions yields te + tc = φW and
equation (2) from the basic model. Together they imply (3) from the basic model.
Adding trade in goods that embody carbon-based energy doesn’t matter when we
limit the policy to consist of an extraction tax and a consumption tax. Home still
uses both taxes, with their ratio being the relative price sensitivity of implicit
energy demand to energy supply in Foreign. The sum of the tax rates remains
equal to the Pigouvian global externality.
While the bottom line looks like the solution to the basic model, there is a key
distinction. In Section 2 we found that the combination of an extraction tax and
a consumption tax was optimal. Here that’s not necessarily true since we imposed
a carbon policy consisting of only those two taxes (and then found a condition for
their optimal magnitudes). In what follows we explore other taxes, and how they
might replace or be combined with an extraction and consumption tax.
16

If we were to introduce an arbitrary global emissions goal, as in the basic model, we would
replace (5) with a Lagrangian incorporating a constraint Ē on emissions. In the formulas that
follow φW would be replaced with the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint.
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3.3

Taxing Extraction and Production

Suppose that instead of an extraction and consumption tax Home is restricted to an
extraction tax and a production tax, tp . Under a production tax pde = pxe = pe + tp
for goods produced in Home and pfe = pxe = pe for goods produced in Foreign, no
matter where they are consumed.
While we didn’t need to consider leakage in the combination of an extraction
tax and a consumption tax, with a production tax we do. Unlike with a tax on
consumption, a tax on Home’s production reduces its comparative advantage,
causing a shift in the location of production and hence leakage. Leakage is
conventionally defined as the increase in Foreign emissions relative to the decrease
in domestic emissions, for a given change in tp :
Λ=−

∂G∗e /∂tp
> 0.
∂Ge /∂tp

(6)

Note that there are two sources of leakage captured by Λ.17 Foreign can
increase its use of energy to serve its own consumers: Cef might go up relative to
Cex in response to an increase in tp . In addition, Home can increase its imports
from Foreign: Cem might go up relative to Ced in response to an increase in tp .
With only a production tax, Home is subject to both sources of leakage. As we
will see, if Home is also able to tax consumption (i.e. taxing imports), it can
eliminate the latter source, leaving only the increase in Cef relative to Cex , or what
we will call “Foreign leakage.”
Home maximizes the objective L in (5) by choosing te and tp (the full derivation
is in Appendix C.2). Evaluating the first-order conditions yields the analog of
equation (2), now for the optimal ratio of an extraction tax to a production tax:
te
|G∗′ | + Λ|G′e |
= e
.
tp
(1 − Λ)Q∗′
e

(7)

The energy-price sensitivity of Foreign production, |G∗′
e |, tilts the optimum toward
∗′
an extraction tax in (7), similar to how |Ce | does so in (2). Furthermore, greater
leakage, as measured by Λ, makes it optimal to tax extraction at a higher rate
relative to production. The reason is that with more leakage, the production tax
17

Our use of a Greek letter does not imply that the leakage rate is an invariant constant. It
will typically vary with the production tax rate, for example.
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becomes less effective in lowering global emissions.
The first order conditions also imply:
te +

tp
= φW .
1−Λ

(8)

As leakage goes up the (unweighted) sum of the two taxes goes down. The policy
becomes less effective with greater leakage, and Home responds by taxing less.
The optimal extraction-production tax loses the feature that the sum of the taxes
imposed by Home—here the wedge it creates between the after-tax price paid by
its producers and the after-tax price received by its extractors—is equal to the
global social cost of carbon, as in the extraction-consumption policy. Leakage
limits Home’s willingness to tax carbon.
Combining (7) and (8) gives the analog of (3) for an extraction-production
tax:
|G∗′ | + Λ|G′e |
te = φW ∗′ e ∗′
Qe + |Ge | + Λ|G′e |
(9)
(1 − Λ)Q∗′
e
W
tp = φ
.
∗′
′
Q∗′
e + |Ge | + Λ|Ge |
Greater leakage not only tilts taxes toward extraction, it actually raises the
extraction tax rate (while lowering the production tax rate by even more).

3.4

Taxing Extraction, Consumption, and Production

Finally, suppose Home is free to choose td , tx , and tm independently (together
with an extraction tax, te ).18 The effective cost of energy is pe + td for Home
producers supplying the domestic market, pe + tm for Foreign producers supplying
imports to Home, and pe + tx for Home exporters. Home maximizes the objective
L in (5) by choosing te , td , tm , and tx (the full derivation is in Appendix C.3).
Although Home has the flexibility to tax imports differently than domestically
produced goods, it chooses not to. The first-order conditions for tm and td imply
td = tm . Home acts as if it’s choosing a consumption tax: td = tm = tc .
Because this policy involves elements of a production tax as well, in the form
of tx , we need to introduce leakage again. Due to the consumption-tax element
18

This freedom still does not allow Home to reach the optimal policy found in Kortum and
Weisbach (2021). That policy also includes per-unit export subsidies for exported goods. We
ignore that feature of an optimal policy in this paper.
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that we just derived, however, there is no leakage in serving Home consumers –
producers in both Home and Foreign face the same price of energy when selling
in Home. If tx > 0, however, Foreign producers still have an advantage relative
to Home producers when serving Foreign consumers, resulting in Foreign leakage
(denoted with a *). Foreign leakage is the increase in Foreign production to serve
Foreign consumers relative to the decrease in Home production to serve Foreign
consumers, both for a given change in tx :
Λ∗ = −

∂Cef /∂tx
> 0.
∂Cex /∂tx

(10)

The first-order conditions for te , tc , and tx yield two tax ratios. The first is
the analog of that for the extraction-production policy (7):
|C f ′ | + Λ∗ |Cex′ |
te
= e
.
tx
(1 − Λ∗ )Q∗′
e
The second is the analog of that for the extraction-consumption policy (2):
te
|C f ′ | + Λ∗ |Cex′ |
.
= e
tc
Q∗′
e

(11)

The numerator of (11) is less than |Ce∗′ | as long as Λ∗ < 1. With Foreign leakage
below 100% it is optimal to raise the consumption tax relative to the extraction
tax, compared to the case for an extraction-consumption tax (2). Keeping a tax
on Home’s exports means that Foreign consumers are taxed, reducing the need
for Home to use the extraction tax to lower the tax on Home consumers.
These first-order conditions also imply te + tc = φW as for an extractionconsumption tax. Combining all these results, the optimal policy is:
te = φ W
tc = φ

|Cef ′ | + Λ∗ |Cex′ |

f′
∗
x′
Q∗′
e + |Ce | + Λ |Ce |
∗′
Qe
W

Q∗′
e +
∗

|Cef ′ |

+

(12)

Λ∗ |Cex′ |

tx = (1 − Λ )tc .
While we refer to it as an extraction-production-consumption tax, the production
component is only present in the tax on exports, tx .
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Two restricted versions of this policy are insightful. The first is to simply set
tx = 0, ignoring the corresponding first-order condition. The resulting problem
is equivalent to taxing only extraction and consumption, as in Section 3.2. It
emerges as optimal here if Λ∗ = 1. If Foreign leakage is 100%, taxing exports
doesn’t reduce global emissions so it is best to set tx = 0. The second is to set
tx = tc . This condition would be optimal if Λ∗ = 0. If there were no Foreign
leakage, there would be no reason to lower the tax on exports relative to the tax
on domestic consumption.19

3.5

Policy Implementation

In Section 2.3 we noted that if we start with a nominal extraction tax of τ , adding
partial border adjustments 0 < βe < τ on the imports and exports of energy shifts
a portion of the tax downstream. In the basic model (i.e., without manufacturing)
these border adjustments shift βe of the tax all the way downstream to consumers
of energy leaving an effective tax te = τ − βe on extraction.
When we add manufacturing and trade in goods, border adjustments on
energy shift the tax to producers who use energy to manufacture goods. Home
needs additional border adjustments on the imports and exports of goods to
shift the tax to the implicit consumption of carbon. Because the extractionproduction-consumption policy treats imports and exports of goods differently
19

This second policy might also arise because of legal or policy constraints. For example,
trade law might require exports to be taxed at the same rate as domestic consumption. Such
considerations likely influenced the design of the EU’s proposed CBAM (see footnote 4). If Home
is constrained to set tx = tc , it should optimize over t̃c (a combined consumption-production tax,
so that tx = tc = t̃c ) and te . To solve the resulting first-order conditions requires introducing
yet a third measure of leakage:
Λ̃∗ = −

∂Cef /∂ t̃c
,
∂Ce /∂ t̃c + ∂Cex /∂ t̃c

so that Λ̃∗ < Λ∗ . The solution for optimal tax rates is:
te = φW
t̃c = φW

|Cef ′ | + Λ̃∗ |Ce′ + Cex′ |
f′
∗
′
x′
Q∗′
e + |Ce | + Λ̃ |Ce + Ce |

(1 − Λ̃∗ )Q∗′
e
f′
∗
′
x′
Q∗′
e + |Ce | + Λ̃ |Ce + Ce |

.

The form of these expressions is familiar from the solution for taxing extraction and production,
in Section 3.3.
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(that is, tp ̸= tc ), Home needs separate border adjustments to implement this
policy: a border adjustment on the energy content of imports of goods (βm ), and
a border adjustment on the energy content of exports of goods (βx ). With these
three border adjustments (βe , βm , and βx ) and a nominal tax on the extraction
of energy, (τ ), Home can implement any of the three hybrids considered in this
paper. Table 2 shows the mapping, specific to each policy, from effective tax rates
to a nominal tax on extraction together with border adjustments, that achieves
the same outcome.
Table 2: Policy Implementation with Border Adjustments
Taxes on:

τ

βe

βm

βx

extraction and production

te + tp < φW

tp

0

0

extraction and consumption

te + tc = φW

tc

tc

tc

extraction, production, and consumption

te + tc = φW

tc

tc

tc − tx

τ is the nominal extraction tax, βe is the border adjustment on energy, βm (imports)
and βx (exports) are border adjustments on goods.

To implement the extraction-production hybrid in expression (9), the first row
of Table 2 shows that Home would impose a nominal extraction tax of τ = te + tp
and border adjustments on imports and exports of energy at a lower rate of
βe = tp . This shifts tp downstream to production, leaving τ − tp on extraction.
Because this border adjustment is only on energy, it would be simple to implement
– energy imports and exports are already highly regulated and monitored. It would,
moreover, only require a slight rewording of existing legislative proposals, namely
reducing the magnitude of the border adjustment on energy from τ to βe (as well
as eliminating any border adjustments on goods found in the legislation).
To implement the extraction-consumption hybrid in expression (3), Home
would impose a nominal extraction tax of τ = te + tc and border adjustments
on imports of energy at a lower rate of βe = tc , much like for the extractionproduction case. To shift the tax downstream to consumption, however, Home
would also have to impose border adjustments on imports and exports of goods
(βm and βx respectively) also at rate tc . This leaves a tax of τ − tc on extraction,
and no tax on production. As we discuss in Kortum and Weisbach (2017),
computing accurate border adjustments on goods is expensive and complex
22

because there is no straightforward way to determine the implicit energy content
of imports (or even exports). Any resulting border adjustments are likely to be
inaccurate. Whether it is worth to incur these costs to impose border adjustments
on goods depends on whether, and if so by how much, the extraction-consumption
hybrid outperforms the extraction-production hybrid, an issue we explore in our
quantitative illustrations of Section 4.
Finally, to implement the combination of all three taxes (12), Home would
again impose a nominal extraction tax of τ = te + tc . The border adjustment
on energy and on imports of goods is βe = βm = tc . Unlike with the extractionconsumption tax, however, there is an even lower border adjustment on the export
of goods, βx = tc − tx . That is, to tax exports at an effective rate of tx under this
implementation, producers of goods would receive an export rebate of βx = Λ∗ tc .
The tax on production is proportional to Foreign leakage. If Λ∗ is zero, there
should be no rebate on exports. As Foreign leakage goes up, so does the export
rebate. With Λ∗ = 1, the rebate on exports of goods would equal the tax on
imports of goods. There would be no tax on production, and the combined policy
would be an extraction-consumption tax. That is, the value of Foreign leakage,
Λ∗ , gives us the answer to the commonly-posed policy question of whether border
adjustments should include rebates of prior taxes paid for exports of goods. While
implementing this three-way hybrid involves all the difficulties associated with
computing the carbon content of goods, it would be no more difficult to administer
than the extraction-consumption tax.

3.6

Policy Coordination

How does Home’s optimal policy adjust if Foreign also implements carbon taxes?
Using notation similar to that for Home, suppose Foreign taxes its extraction at
rate t∗e , its production for domestic consumption at rate tf , its imports (Home’s
exports) at rate t∗x , and its exports (Home’s imports) at rate t∗m . Home then sets
its policy taking these rates as given.
Consider the case from Section 3.4, where Home can tax extraction, consumption, and production. In this case, Home’s basic policy remains the same:
te + tc = φW and tx = (1 − Λ∗ )tc .20 Home, however, adjusts the policy along two
dimensions. (The full derivation is in Appendix C.4.)
While the expressions for Home’s policy are the same, the value of Λ∗ may not be because
Foreign’s taxes will affect the benefits of shifting production to Foreign.
20
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First, Home reduces its carbon tax on imported goods so that the overall tax
on imports is tm + t∗m = tc . The logic is to keep Home consumption from being
distorted by the tax on imports, hence crediting the tax imposed by Foreign.
This feature appears in proposed border adjustments in US carbon-tax bills (see
footnote 3) and in the EU’s CBAM (see footnote 4), both of which would credit
carbon prices already paid on imported goods that are subject to the border
adjustment.
Second, the mix of te and tc changes to reflect Foreign’s mix of taxes. In
particular, Home adds ta to its extraction tax in (12) and subtracts ta from its
consumption tax, where ta depends on a combination of Foreign taxes:
ta =

f′
∗
x′
t∗e Q∗′
e − tf |Ce | − tx |Ce |
f′
∗
x′
Q∗′
e + |Ce | + Λ |Ce |

.

(13)

The logic is that Home shifts its taxes to align more closely with Foreign taxes on
extraction and consumption, e.g. raising te (and lowering tc ) if t∗e increases.
To illustrate, suppose that Foreign chose to impose its tax entirely on extraction,
setting tf = t∗x = t∗m = 0. Furthermore, suppose that the level of Foreign’s
carbon tax is the same as Home’s, so that t∗e = φW . In this case, applying (13),
Home would also choose to tax only extraction because doing so would eliminate
distortions on the supply side and avoid introducing distortions on the demand
side. Roughly the same logic would hold if Foreign chose to tax only the demand
side, although the plethora of demand-side taxes makes it messy.
We get a sharp result if, in parallel to Home’s policy, Foreign’s tax on its
imports doesn’t distort its own consumption, i.e. t∗x = tf − tx . In this case we
can can think of tf as Foreign’s consumption tax, t∗c . This policy requires, akin
to a Nash equilibrium, that Foreign anticipate Home’s optimal tax on exports,
tx = (1 − Λ∗ )tc . In this setting, Home’s optimal extraction and consumption taxes
satisfy (4), with φ̃∗ = t∗e + t∗c . Home thus mimics the extraction and consumption
taxes in Foreign, then adjusts the overall level of the two according to how Foreign
supply and demand respond to the energy price, as in (2).

4

Quantitative Illustrations

To get a sense of the size of the economic benefits from the various types of
hybrid taxes, we calibrate and simulate the model described in Part 3. Our
24

sufficient-statistic formulas for optimal taxes in Sections 2 and 3 give intuitions,
but they don’t allow us to compute numerical values or to compare welfare across
all policies. To do this, we need to add structure to the model, including functional
forms for extraction and production and for the efficiency of production of goods in
each region. We follow the approach taken in Kortum and Weisbach (2021), which
is fully described there. Appendix D shows that the analysis here is compatible
with the structure imposed in Kortum and Weisbach (2021).
We calibrate the business as usual competitive equilibrium of the model to
the data on global carbon flows from Table 1. Then, following the approach in
Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007), we can compute the effects of various policies
relative to this baseline. Calibrating the model this way subsumes transport costs
for goods, which Kortum and Weisbach (2021) model as iceberg costs.
In addition to our calibration to the CO2 matrix, we also need values for
several elasticities. As we will discuss, a key parameter is Foreign’s elasticity
∗
∗
of energy supply, ϵ∗S = pe Q∗′
e /Qe . Our baseline value is ϵS = 0.5 but because of
uncertainty in this value, we also show simulations for ϵ∗S = 2.21
Our figures show what we call “policy frontiers” for various combinations of
taxes. Along the x-axis of the frontier is the cost of the policy, measured as
the decline in services consumption as a percent of the business-as-usual level of
spending on goods consumption (ignoring the benefits of emissions reductions).
The y-axis shows the resulting global emissions reductions as a percent of their
business-as-usual level (which with no policy is 32.3 gigatons of CO2 ). The frontier
for a given policy (when optimized) is traced out by ranging over values of φW ,
so that each point on the line shows the emissions reductions that Home’s policy
would achieve for a given social cost of carbon. The red x on each line shows the
policy that Home would choose in each case when φW = 2, which means that the
global social cost of a unit of carbon is twice the value of energy containing a unit
of carbon.
Figure 6 compares the three hybrid policies and the two standard approaches
to carbon taxes, a tax on domestic production and that same tax with border
adjustments on goods (which shifts it to domestic consumption). As can be seen,
with this calibration, all three hybrid policies perform similarly and substantially
21

We also set the share of energy in production equal to 0.15, the Foreign demand elasticity
= pe Ce∗′ /Ce∗ ) equal to 1, and the trade elasticity equal to 4. These parameters are described
briefly in Appendix D, with more details on the calibration explained in Kortum and Weisbach
(2021).
(ϵ∗D

25

outperform the two standard approaches. For example, adding an extraction-tax
component to a production tax nearly doubles the global emissions reductions
the policy would achieve at any given cost.
In this calibration, there is almost no advantage to adding border adjustments
on goods. The emissions reductions that are achievable with a simpler tax – the
combination of an extraction and production tax – are about the same. Given
the complexities of imposing border adjustments on goods, the modest additional
emissions reductions are unlikely to be worth the costs.
Figure 6 explores the robustness of these results to Foreign’s energy supply
elasticity by setting ϵ∗S = 2 instead of 0.5. The extraction-production tax now
performs less well. The reason is that with a high value of ϵ∗S , the extraction
component of the various hybrid policies, which raise the global energy price,
induce a significant positive response by Foreign extractors. The policies must, as a
result, rely more on demand-side taxes, and the leakage costs of the production tax
therefore play a larger role. In this case, all of the policies that use a consumption
tax as the demand-side tax (including a pure consumption tax) outperform the
policies that rely on a production tax. Because a demand-side tax on consumption
does not cause leakage, policies that impose the demand side tax on consumption
are more robust to the value of ϵ∗s .
Whether the gains from imposing border adjustments on goods (to shift the
tax downstream to consumption) are worth the costs depends primarily on (1)
the risk of a high value of ϵ∗S , (2) the costs of imposing border adjustments on
goods, and (3) the size of the taxing coalition.
To explore the role of coalition size, particularly as measured by production,
we include China in the taxing region. To do so we recalibrate the model to the
values of embodied CO2 shown in Table 3.22 The table shows that moving China
to the region called Home (in Table 1 China was in the region called Foreign)
nearly doubles the baseline amount of CO2 emitted in production by the coalition
(Home), with a somewhat smaller increase in implicit consumption of CO2 .
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the effects of adding China to the taxing coalition.
As expected, under all policies, adding China to the taxing coalition dramatically
increases the possible global emissions reductions. Once again, the hybrid policies
substantially outperform the traditional approaches, indicating that the benefits
22

Table 3 corresponds to Table 9 in Kortum and Weisbach (2021). As for Table 1 above, the
source is the Trade in Embodied CO2 database made available by the OECD (2019).
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Figure 5: Policy frontiers of OECD with low Foreign elasticity
εS = 0.5, εS* = 0.5
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Figure 6: Policy frontiers of OECD with high Foreign elasticity
εS = 0.5, εS* = 2
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Table 3: Calibration for the OECD plus China
Home

Foreign

Total

Home

Ced = 20.1

Cem = 1.7

Ce = 21.8

Foreign

Cex = 1.4

Cef = 9.1

Ce∗ = 10.5

Total

Ge = 21.5

G∗e = 10.8 CeW = 32.3

Extraction Qe = 16.24 Q∗e =16.1

QW
e = 32.3

of the hybrid policies continue even with the larger taxing coalition.23
Another effect of adding China to the taxing coalition is that now the extractionproduction hybrid is more robust to the value of ϵ∗S . Since the coalition now
represents two-thirds of the CO2 emitted in production, there are fewer opportunities for leakage with China in the taxing coalition (Λ declines). As a
consequence, the production tax performs relatively better than with the smaller
taxing coalition.
We suspect that this result is general, in the sense that the choice of the
taxing coalition affects the relative performance of the various taxes. Because the
extraction-production tax is so much simpler to implement, a promising strategy is
to form a taxing coalition for which this tax performs well. In particular, including
countries with a substantial base of production and a high elasticity of energy
supply in the taxing coalition is a promising strategy because doing so lowers both
Λ and ϵ∗S , allowing the taxing region to use the simpler extraction-production
hybrid, thereby avoiding border adjustments on goods.24

5

Discussion and Conclusion

We can summarize our finding as follows:
• When there is trade and the possibility of leakage, carbon taxes are most
efficient if they are imposed on both sides of the market, that is, on both
23

At the limit, however, where the taxing coalition is the entire world, all the taxes would
perform the same. Therefore, at some point, the simple taxes should perform about as well as
the hybrid policies.
24
This strategy, as it relates to the extraction elasticity, has similarities to Harstad (2012).
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Figure 7: Policy frontiers of OECD plus China with low Foreign elasticity
εS = 0.5, εS* = 0.5
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Figure 8: Policy frontiers of OECD plus China with high Foreign elasticity
εS = 0.5, εS* = 2
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the extraction or supply of fossil fuels and the use or demand for fossil
fuels. There are potentially large gains from this strategy. This point,
which was known as early as Markusen (1975) (writing in a related context),
appears not to be widely appreciated. It involves a simple change to current
proposals, and there seems to be no reason not to pursue this approach to
improving the functioning of carbon taxes.
• The relative portion of the tax that should stay on extraction to maximize
efficiency depends on the foreign reaction to the different taxes, as measured
by the slope of foreign’s supply and demand curves. The core idea is similar
to familiar notions in the design of taxes more generally, which is that we
should not impose high taxes on highly responsive items. Here the response
(to the resulting change in the global energy price) is measured by the slope
of the supply and demand curves for energy in non-taxing regions.
• If we do not take administrative costs into account, the taxing region
maximizes efficiency by taxing fossil fuels at all stages of their use as they
flow through the economy: extraction, production, and consumption. The
production component of the tax, however, is muted by leakage. If leakage
were zero, the production tax would be at the same rate as the consumption
tax. If leakage is 100%, the production tax should be zero, with the tax in
that case falling only on extraction and consumption.
• To implement this policy, the taxing region can impose a nominal tax on
extraction, (at the optimum at the global social cost of carbon). It then
shifts a portion of the tax downstream to production via border adjustments
on energy at a lower rate (with the relative rates on extraction and on
production determined as just discussed). In addition, the taxing region
further shifts the tax to consumption by imposing border adjustments on
imports of goods at the same rate as the border adjustments on energy.
Finally, to lower the production tax to account for leakage, it rebates a
portion of the tax on exports of goods.
• This analysis explains how to set the rebate, if any, on exports of goods, a
common problem in carbon tax design. Absent concerns about leakage, to
maximize efficiency, there should be no rebate for exports, leaving the tax
on domestic production equal to the tax on domestic consumption. With
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leakage, however, the taxing region should remove part of the tax on exports,
and if leakage were 100%, the rebate would be of the entire tax previously
paid.
• The administrative costs, however, of imposing a tax on consumption would
be high because there is no straightforward way to observe the emissions
associated with imports of goods. Moreover, in our baseline simulation, the
gains from imposing border adjustments on the imports of goods, relative to
the simpler extraction-production combination, are small. As a result, the
extraction-production tax may be a superior instrument, when taking both
efficiency and administrative costs into account. It could be implemented
simply and accurately by imposing a nominal tax on extraction and border
adjustments on the imports and exports of energy at a lower rate.
• This latter conclusion depends on the foreign elasticity of energy supply. Our
baseline calibration, which assumed that the taxing region was the OECD
and the rest of the world did not impose a tax, set the foreign elasticity
of energy supply at 0.5. As this value goes up, the effectiveness of the
extraction-production tax goes down relative to combinations that include a
consumption tax. The reason is that the extraction tax component becomes
less effective when foreign extraction is more sensitive to the price of energy.
As a result, efficient policies have to rely more on demand-side taxes, and
the demand-side tax in the extraction-production combination is subject to
leakage. The demand-side tax in the extraction-consumption combination
(i.e., with border adjustments on goods) is not subject to leakage. Therefore,
as the foreign elasticity of energy supply goes up, border adjustments on
goods become more desirable.
• Finally, one way to make the tax more effective and simpler is to include
high elasticity of supply countries in the taxing coalition. This makes the
extraction production tax more effective and, therefore, reduces the need
to rely on border adjustments for goods. That is, the make-up of the
taxing coalition and the design of the tax interact, and a well-chosen taxing
coalition may allow a simpler tax system.
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Appendix
A

Extensions of the Basic Model

We drop the linearly separable assumption on welfare in this appendix to consider
both the global optimum and the unilateral optimum. Welfare in either country
is here a general differentiable function of its three arguments, increasing in the
first and second, while decreasing in the third:
U = u(Cs , Ce , E)
U ∗ = u∗ (Cs∗ , Ce∗ , E).
The marginal social costs of carbon for Home and Foreign, in terms of the
numeraire, are:
φ = −(∂u/∂E)/(∂u/∂Cs ) = −u3 /u1
φ∗ = −(∂u∗ /∂E)/(∂u∗ /∂Cs∗ ) = −u∗3 /u∗1 ,
with φW = φ + φ∗ . (For a function f of a vector x, we denote fi = ∂f /∂xi .)

A.1

Global Optimum

Suppose that Home can dictate a policy for Foreign as long as it transfers services
Ts to keep Foreign welfare at a threshold, Ū ∗ . The optimal policy is the solution
to a Lagrangian (with a Lagrange multiplier, µ, on the Foreign welfare constraint):
 ∗ ∗ ∗

∗
max
u(C
,
C
,
Ē)
+
µ
u
(C
,
C
,
Ē)
−
Ū
,
s
e
s
e
∗
∗

{Ts ,Ce ,Qe }

subject to:
Cs = L − c(Ē − Q∗e ) − Ts
Ce = Ē − Ce∗
Cs∗ = L∗ − c∗ (Q∗e ) + Ts .
The first order conditions are: u1 = µu∗1 , u2 = µu∗2 , and u1 c′ = µu∗1 c′∗ , which
can be distilled down to: u2 /u1 = u∗2 /u∗1 and c′ = c∗′ . These two conditions rule
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out a wedge between Home and Foreign either in the marginal value of energy
consumption (in terms of the numeraire) or in the marginal cost of extracting
energy. But, they admit a wedge, common to both countries, between the marginal
cost of extracting energy and it’s marginal value, u2 /u1 − c′ = u∗2 /u∗1 − c∗′ ̸= 0.
The level of this wedge is determined by taking the first-order condition for
the emissions goal itself, Ē:
−u1 c′ + u2 = −u3 − µu∗3 .
Substituting in µ = u1 /u∗1 and dividing through by u1 , we get that the wedge
equals the global externality:
u2 /u1 − c′ = −(u3 /u1 + u∗3 /u∗1 ) = φW .
A key point is that there is no need to distinguish between the consumption wedge,
u2 /u1 − pe , and the extraction wedge, pe − c′ , in this global optimum.
These conditions will hold in a competitive equilibrium with taxes. With
a consumption tax of tc consumers equate their marginal rate of substitution
between energy and services to pe + tc while with an extraction tax of te extractors
equate their marginal extraction costs to pe − te . The first optimality condition
says that a consumption tax must be harmonized between Home and Foreign,
tc = t∗c , while the second says that an extraction tax must be harmonized, te = t∗e .
The third condition says that taxes on extraction and consumption must sum to
the global externality:
tc + te = φW .
Conditional on their sum, the allocation of the tax across consumption and
extraction is arbitrary. Any combination adding to the marginal global social cost
of carbon attains the global optimum.

A.2

Unilateral Optimum

We now turn to the problem of Section 2, the optimal policy when Home can only
indirectly influence Foreign extraction and consumption by choosing the price of
energy. We will continue to assume that Home uses transfers of services, Ts , to
keep Foreign welfare above a threshold of Ū ∗ .
To solve this problem we follow Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) and employ
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Foreign’s expenditure function, defined as:

e∗ (pe , Ū ∗ , Ē) = min Cs∗ + pe Ce∗ | u∗ (Cs∗ , Ce∗ , Ē) = Ū ∗
Two key properties of the expenditure function are:
e∗1 = ∂e∗ /∂pe = Ce∗ (pe , Ū ∗ , Ē)
e∗3 = ∂e∗ /∂ Ē = −u∗3 /u∗1 .
Here Ce∗ (pe , Ū ∗ , Ē) is simply Foreign’s compensated demand for energy. Its partial
∗
derivative with respect to the global emissions goal is denoted by Ce,3
. We treat
the slope of this energy demand curve (the partial derivative with respect to
∗
the energy price) as strictly negative, Ce∗′ < 0 (the notation Ce∗′ , instead of Ce,1
,
facilitates comparison to other results in the paper).
Foreign obtains income from labor, L∗ , and rents from the energy sector,
pe Q∗e − c(Q∗e ). It also gets transfers of services, Ts , and net energy imports, valued
at pe Xe , from Home. (Home’s net exports of energy are Xe = Qe − Ce .) Foreign
expenditure, Y ∗ , is the sum of income, transfers of services, and the value net
energy imports:
Y ∗ = L∗ + (pe Q∗e − c(Q∗e )) + Ts + pe Xe = L∗ + pe Ce∗ − c(Q∗e ) + Ts .
If Foreign expenditure is Y ∗ = e∗ (pe , Ū ∗ , Ē) it can achieve welfare of Ū ∗ when the
energy price is pe and the global emissions goal is Ē.
Foreign’s energy supply curve, Q∗e (pe ), satisfies c∗′ (Q∗e (pe )) = pe . The slope of
this energy supply curve is Q∗′
e > 0.
Home’s optimal policy is then the solution to the Lagrangian:


max u(Cs , Ce , Ē) + µ L∗ + pe Ce∗ − c∗ (Q∗e ) + Ts − e∗ (pe , Ū ∗ , Ē) ,

{Ts ,pe }

subject to:
Q∗e = Q∗e (pe )
Ce∗ = Ce∗ (pe , Ū ∗ , Ē)
Cs = L − c(Ē − Q∗e (pe )) − Ts
Ce = Ē − Ce∗ (pe , Ū ∗ , Ē).
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Here, to control outcomes in Foreign, we maximize over pe whereas in the first-best
problem we maximized separately over Ce∗ and Q∗e .
The first-order conditions are u1 = µ and:
∗′
∗
∗′
∗′ ∗′
∗
u1 c′ Q∗′
e − u2 Ce = µ (−Ce − pe Ce + c Qe + e1 ) .

Applying e∗1 = Ce∗ and c∗′ = pe they reduce to:
∗′
(pe − c′ )Q∗′
e = (u2 /u1 − pe )|Ce |.

Since u2 /u1 has the same interpretation as u′ in Section 2, this result shows
that equation (1) in the paper is robust to welfare being non-separable in it’s
arguments.
The first-order condition for the emissions goal is:
∗
∗
−u1 c′ + u2 − u2 Ce,3
+ u3 = µ −pe Ce,3
+ e∗3



and hence the overall wedge is:
∗
u2 /u1 − c′ = (u2 /u1 − pe ) Ce,3
+ φW .

This conditions looks like that for the global optimum, but with an additional term.
∗
Suppose Ce,3
> 0 so that Foreign’s compensated demand for energy is increasing
25
in Ē. This term gives an added reason for Home to lower emissions, as doing so
shifts energy consumption away from Foreign. Such a shift is beneficial because
the value of energy consumption is higher in Home then in Foreign, ue /us > pe , as
∗
dictated by the second condition. For linearly separable Foreign welfare Ce,3
=0
and this first condition collapses to the corresponding condition for the global
optimum.
For example, if Foreign welfare is u∗ (Cs∗ , Ce∗ , Ē) = (Cs∗ )γ (Ce∗ )1−γ (Ē)−ϕ then its compensated
demand for energy is:
ϕ ∗
Ce∗ (pe , Ū ∗ , Ē) = ((1 − γ)/γ)γ p−γ
e (Ē) Ū ,
25

∗
and Ce,3
= ϕCe∗ /Ē > 0. If instead Foreign welfare is linearly separable, u∗ (Cs∗ , Ce∗ , Ē) =
∗
Cs + u (Ce∗ ) − φ∗ Ē (with u∗′ > 0 and u∗′′ < 0), then its compensated demand for energy
∗
depends only on the energy price and Ce,3
= 0.
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Solving for the individual taxes:
Q∗′
e
∗′ | − C ∗ Q∗′
Q∗′
+
|C
e,3 e
e
e
∗′
|Ce |
te = φW ∗′
.
∗
Q∗′
Qe + |Ce∗′ | − Ce,3
e
tc = φW

These expressions are the same as (3) in the paper except that each has an
∗
additional term Ce,3
Q∗′
e in the denominator.

B

Trade Balance

Suppose that we impose trade balance, Cs − Qs = pe (Qe − Ce ) = pe Xe (hence
Ts + pe Xe = 0) while removing the constraint that Home maintain Foreign
welfare Ū ∗ . The planner’s problem in Section 2 is unchanged except that the first
constraint becomes:
Cs = L − c(Ē − Q∗e (pe )) + pe (Ce∗ (pe ) − Q∗e (pe )).
The first-order condition for pe gives:
′
∗′
(pe − c′ )Q∗′
e − Xe = (u − pe )|Ce |

(14)

Replacing each wedge with the corresponding tax rate, it follows that:
∗′
te Q∗′
e = tc |Ce | + Xe .

If Home is a net exporter of energy it improves its terms of trade by relying more
on the extraction tax rather than the consumption tax.
The first-order condition for the emissions goal is u′ − c′ = φ, which implies
te + tc = φ.
When Home is not forced to choose a Pareto improving policy, it ignores the social
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cost of carbon in Foreign, φ∗ . Combining results, we get the analog of (3):
φ|Ce∗′ | + Xe
∗′
Q∗′
e + |Ce |
∗′
φQ − Xe
tc = ∗′ e
.
Qe + |Ce∗′ |

te =

(15)

The two differences are that φ replaces φW and that positive net exports of energy
from Home tilt the policy towards an extraction tax and away from a consumption
tax.
So far we have assumed that Foreign does not tax carbon. Section 2.4 shows
that, under a Foreign welfare constraint, Home’s optimal policy would adapt to
carbon taxes in Foreign. Here, with the constraint on Foreign welfare removed,
the expression for the first-order condition (14) is invariant to carbon taxes in
Foreign.26 The reason for this invariance is that Home is no longer concerned
with global wedges, the gap in the marginal cost of extraction between Home and
Foreign and the gap in the marginal utility of consumption between Home and
Foreign. Instead, Home is only concerned with its own wedges, the gap between
the marginal cost of extraction as well as the marginal utility of consumption and
the global price at which it can buy or sell energy.

C

Trade in Energy and Goods

Here we provide derivations of the optimality conditions in Section 3. Each case
involves optimizing the objective (5) by choosing tax rates. The price of energy
responds endogenously to the choice of taxes so as to clear the energy market,
which we denote by dpe /dti for i ∈ {e, d, m, x}. (We denote ∂xe /∂pe by x′e for any
quantity of extraction or consumption of energy xe .)
To simplify the first-order conditions that follow we exploit envelope conditions.
Roy’s identity gives: ũ1 = −Ced , ũ2 = −Cem , ũ∗1 = −Cef , and ũ∗2 = −Cex . Hotelling’s
lemma gives: ∂Re /∂pe = Qe (hence ∂Re /∂te = −Qe ) and ∂Re∗ /∂pe = Q∗e . In
combination, these results eliminate a term that would otherwise appear in each
26

Of course carbon taxes in Foreign would alter equilibrium outcomes so that all the elements
of the first-order condition would need to be evaluated at the new equilibrium. Furthermore
∗
∗′
∗
Q∗′
e would be evaluated at pe − te and Ce at pe + tc (rather than both being evaluated at pe ),
∗
∗
where te is the extraction tax and tc the consumption tax imposed by Foreign.
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of the first-order conditions, since:



∂Re ∂Re∗
dpe
∗
∗
W dpe
+
+ ũ1 + ũ2 + ũ1 + ũ2
= QW
= 0,
e − Ce
∂pe
∂pe
dti
dti

(16)

for i ∈ {e, d, m, x}.
The derivatives of Home tax revenue are: ∂Rt /∂pe = te Q′e + td Ced′ + tm Cem′ +
tx Cex′ , ∂Rt /∂te = Qe + te ∂Qe /∂te , and ∂Rt /∂ti = Cei + ti ∂Cei /∂ti , for i ∈ {d, m, x}.
We now apply these results to the specific cases considered in Section 3.

C.1

Taxing Extraction and Consumption

A consumption tax sets td = tm = tc and tx = 0. The first-order conditions for
maximizing (5) with respect to te and tc , after applying (16), are:


∂Re ∂Rt ∂Rt dpe
∂Qe
W
W ′ ∂pe
+
+
=φ
+ Qe
∂te
∂te
∂pe dte
∂te
∂te
∂Rt ∂Rt dpe
′ ∂pe
+
+ ũ1 + ũ2 = φW QW
e
∂tc
∂pe dtc
∂tc
Applying the other envelope results and canceling terms, we get:


∂Qe
∂Qe
′
′ dpe
W
W ′ dpe
te
+ (te Qe + tc Ce )
=φ
+ Qe
∂te
dte
∂te
dte
dpe
∂Ce
′ dpe
tc
+ (te Q′e + tc Ce′ )
= φW QW
.
e
∂tc
dtc
dtc
Energy market-clearing implies:


dpe
−1
∂Qe
=
W
′
W
′
dte
Q − Ce
∂t
 e
 e
∂Ce
dpe
1
=
.
W
′
W
′
dtc
Q e − Ce
∂tc
Substituting these price derivatives into the first-order conditions, canceling
∂Qe /∂te from the first, and canceling ∂Ce /∂tc from the second, we arrive at:

′
te CeW ′ − QW
+ te Q′e + tc Ce′ = φW CeW ′
e

′
W′
′
tc QW
+ te Q′e + tc Ce′ = φW QW
e − Ce
e .
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Subtracting the second from the first yields te + tc = φW . Substituting this
expression for φW back into the first gives:
te
|C ∗′ |
= e∗′ .
tc
Qe
Combining the two gives (3), which is the solution to the problem in Section 3.2.

C.2

Taxing Extraction and Production

A production tax sets td = tx = tp and tm = 0. The first-order conditions for
maximizing (5) with respect to te and tp , after applying (16), are:


∂Qe
∂Re ∂Rt ∂Rt dpe
W
W ′ ∂pe
+
+
=φ
+ Qe
∂te
∂te
∂pe dte
∂te
∂te
∂Rt ∂Rt dpe
∂p
e
′
+
+ ũ1 + ũ∗2 = φW QW
e
∂tp
∂pe dtp
∂tp
Applying the other envelope results and canceling terms, we get:


∂Qe
∂Qe
′
W
W ′ dpe
′ dpe
te
+ (te Qe + tp Ge )
=φ
+ Qe
∂te
dte
∂te
dte
dpe
∂Ge
′ dpe
tp
+ (te Q′e + tp G′e )
= φW QW
.
e
∂tp
dtp
dtp
Energy market clearing implies:


dpe
−1
∂Qe
=
W
′
W
′
dte
Q − Ge
∂te

 e
∂GW
dpe
1
e
=
.
′ − GW ′
dtp
QW
∂t
p
e
e
In the second market clearing equation we can substitute in the formula for leakage
(6), in the form ∂GW
e /∂tp = (1 − Λ)∂Ge /∂tp .
Substituting each of the two market-clearing conditions into the corresponding
first-order condition, canceling ∂Qe /∂te from the first, and canceling ∂Ge /∂tp
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from the second, we get:

′
W′
′
+ te Q′e + tp G′e = φW GW
te GW
e
e − Qe

tp
′
W′
′
+ te Q′e + tp G′e = φW QW
QW
e .
e − Ge
1−Λ
Subtracting the second from the first yields (8), te +tp /(1−Λ) = φW . Substituting
this expression for φW back into the first equation we get the analog of (7) and
hence (9).

C.3

Taxing Extraction, Consumption, and Production

In this most general case tax rates are unconstrained, resulting in four first-order
conditions for maximizing the objective (5) with respect to te , td , tm , and tx .
The first order conditions for td and tm , after applying (16), are:
∂Rt ∂Rt ∂pe
′ dpe
+
+ ũ1 = φW QW
e
∂td
∂pe ∂td
dtd
∂Rt ∂Rt ∂pe
′ dpe
+
+ ũ2 = φW QW
.
e
∂tm
∂pe ∂tm
dtm
Applying the other envelope results and canceling terms, we get:
 dpe
∂Ced
′ dpe
+ td Ced′ + tm Cem′ + tx Cex′ + te Q′e
= φW QW
e
∂td
dtd
dtd
m

∂C
dpe
′ dpe
tm e + td Ced′ + tm Cem′ + tx Cex′ + te Q′e
= φW QW
.
e
∂tm
dtm
dtm
td

Energy market clearing implies:


dpe
1
∂Ced
=
dtd
QW ′ − CeW ′ ∂td
 e

dpe
1
∂Cem
=
,
′
W′
dtm
QW
∂tm
e − Ce
Substituting in these price derivatives, the first-order conditions reduce to td = tm .
It is optimal to tax energy embodied in Home’s consumption at the same rate,
tc = td = tm , whether the goods are produced domestically or imported. Applying
this condition, we can add Ced and Cem to form a single first-order condition for tc .
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Following the same procedures as above, the first order conditions for te , tc ,
and tx can now be reduced to:


∂Qe
∂Qe
′
′
x′ dpe
W
W ′ dpe
te
+ (te Qe + tc Ce + tx Ce )
=φ
+ Qe
∂te
dte
∂te
dte
dpe
∂Ce
′ dpe
tc
+ (te Q′e + tc Ce′ + tx Cex′ )
= φW QW
e
∂tc
dtc
dtc
x
dpe
∂C
′ dpe
tx e + (te Q′e + tc Ce′ + tx Cex′ )
= φW QW
.
e
∂tx
dtx
dtx
The corresponding market-clearing conditions are:


∂Qe
dpe
−1
=
W
′
W
′
dte
Q − Ce
∂t
 e
 e
1
dpe
∂Ce
=
W
′
W
′
dtc
Q − Ce
∂t
 e
 c∗
dpe
1
∂Ce
=
.
W
′
W
′
dtx
Qe − Ce
∂tx
In the last of these market-clearing conditions we can substitute in the formula
for Foreign leakage (10), in the form ∂Ce∗ /∂tx = (1 − Λ∗ )∂Cex /∂tx .
Substituting each of the three market-clearing conditions into the corresponding
first-order condition, canceling ∂Qe /∂te from the first, canceling ∂Ce /∂tc from
the second, and canceling ∂Cex /∂tx from the third, we get a simple three-equation
system:

tx
1−Λ


′
te CeW ′ − QW
+ (te Q′e + tc Ce′ + tx Cex′ ) = φW CeW ′
e

′
W′
′
tc QW
+ (te Q′e + tc Ce′ + tx Cex′ ) = φW QW
e − Ce
e

W′
′
′
+ (te Q′e + tc Ce′ + tx Cex′ ) = φW QW
QW
e − Ce
e .
∗

Subtracting the third equation from the first, much like for the extractionproduction tax, gives te + tx /(1 − Λ∗ ) = φW . Subtracting the second from
the first, we get te + tc = φW as in the extraction-consumption case. Together
these two results imply tx = (1 − Λ∗ )tc . Substituting these results for φW and tx
back into the first equation we get the ratio of the extraction to consumption tax
rate, given in (11). Together these results yield expressions for all three taxes,
given in (12).
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C.4

Policy Coordination

For the extraction-consumption-production case, we now allow for the possibility
that Foreign taxes carbon at rates t∗e , tf , t∗m , and t∗x . Foreign is not strategic, so
we treat these tax rates as unchanging parameters. Here t∗m is the tax rate that
Foreign applies to carbon embodied in Home’s imports of goods (hence Foreign’s
exports) and t∗x is the tax rate that Foreign applies to carbon embodied in Home’s
exports of goods (hence Foreign’s imports). Thus the flows of carbon Cem and Cex
may be taxed both by Home and Foreign, at rate tm + t∗m and tx + t∗x , respectively.
Foreign tax revenue, Rt∗ , which now enters the objective function (5), is given
by:
Rt∗ = t∗e Q∗e + tf Cef + t∗m Cem + t∗x Cex .
f′
∗
m′
∗ x′
The derivatives of Foreign tax revenue are: ∂Rt∗ /∂pe = t∗e Q∗′
e +tf Ce +tm Ce +tx Ce ,
∂Rt∗ /∂tm = t∗m ∂Cem /∂tm , and ∂Rt∗ /∂tx = t∗x ∂Cex /∂tx . Note that ∂Rt∗ /∂te =
∂Rt∗ /∂td = 0.
The objective (5) becomes:
∗ f
x
W
L = Re + Re∗ + Rt + Rt∗ + ũ(pde , pm
e ) + ũ (pe , pe ) − φ E.

There are four first-order conditions for maximizing it with respect to te , td , tm ,
and tx . The first order conditions for td and tm , after applying (16), are:
∂Rt ∂Rt ∂pe ∂Rt∗ ∂pe
′ dpe
+
+
+ ũ1 = φW QW
e
∂td
∂pe ∂td
∂pe ∂td
dtd
∂Rt ∂Rt∗ ∂Rt ∂pe
∂Rt∗ ∂pe
′ dpe
+
+
+
+ ũ2 = φW QW
.
e
∂tm
∂tm
∂pe ∂tm
∂pe ∂tm
dtm
Applying the other envelope results and canceling terms, we get:


∂Ced
∂Rt ∂Rt∗ dpe
′ dpe
td
+
+
= φW QW
e
∂td
∂p
∂pe dtd
dtd
 e

m
∗
∂C
∂Rt ∂Rt dpe
′ dpe
(tm + t∗m ) e +
+
= φW QW
.
e
∂tm
∂pe
∂pe dtm
dtm
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Energy market clearing implies:


dpe
1
∂Ced
=
dtd
QW ′ − CeW ′ ∂td
 e

dpe
1
∂Cem
=
,
′
W′
dtm
QW
∂tm
e − Ce
Substituting in these price derivatives, the first-order conditions reduce to td =
tm + t∗m .
It is optimal to tax energy embodied in Home’s consumption at the same rate,
tc = td = tm + t∗m , whether the goods are produced domestically or imported,
while ignoring whether the tax is applied by Home, by Foreign, or by both. If
Foreign taxes Home’s imports at a higher rate, Home reduces its tax on imports
to keep the overall tax, tm + t∗m , equal to td . Applying this condition and noting
that ∂Ced /∂td + ∂Cem /∂tm = ∂Ce /∂tc , we can add these two first-order conditions
to form a first-order condition for tc .
The first order conditions for te , tc , and tx reduce to:



∂Qe
∂Qe
′
∗ ∗′
′
f′
∗
x′ dpe
W
W ′ dpe
te
+ te Qe + te Qe + tc Ce + tf Ce + (tx + tx )Ce
=φ
+ Qe
∂te
dte
∂te
dte

∂Ce
′
f′
∗
x′ dpe
′ dpe
tc
+ te Q′e + t∗e Q∗′
= φW QW
e + tc Ce + tf Ce + (tx + tx )Ce
e
∂tc
dtc
dtc
x

∂C
′ dpe
′
f′
∗
x′ dpe
tx e + te Q′e + t∗e Q∗′
= φW QW
.
e
e + tc Ce + tf Ce + (tx + tx )Ce
∂tx
dtx
dtx
The corresponding market-clearing conditions are:


dpe
−1
∂Qe
=
W
′
W
′
dte
Q − Ce
∂t
 e
 e
dpe
1
∂Ce
=
W
′
W
′
dtc
Q − Ce
∂t
 e
 c∗
dpe
1
∂Ce
=
.
W
′
W
′
dtx
Qe − Ce
∂tx
In the last of these market-clearing conditions we can substitute in the formula
for Foreign leakage (10), in the form ∂Ce∗ /∂tx = (1 − Λ∗ )∂Cex /∂tx .
Substituting each of the three market-clearing conditions into the corresponding
first-order condition, canceling ∂Qe /∂te from the first, canceling ∂Ce /∂tc from
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the second, and canceling ∂Cex /∂tx from the third, we get:

tx
1−Λ



x′
∗
f′
′
′
= φW CeW ′
+ te Q′e + t∗e Q∗′
te CeW ′ − QW
e + tc Ce + tf Ce + (tx + tx )Ce
e


′
W′
′
f′
∗
x′
′
tc QW
+ te Q′e + t∗e Q∗′
= φW QW
e − Ce
e + tc Ce + tf Ce + (tx + tx )Ce
e


′
W′
′
f′
∗
x′
′
QW
+ te Q′e + t∗e Q∗′
= φW QW
e − Ce
e + tc Ce + tf Ce + (tx + tx )Ce
e .
∗

Subtracting the third from the first, much like for the extraction-production
tax, gives te + tx /(1 − Λ∗ ) = φW . Subtracting the second from the first, we
get te + tc = φW as in the extraction-consumption case. Together these two
results imply tx = (1 − Λ∗ )tc . Substituting the result for tc = φW − te and for
tx = (1 − Λ∗ )(φW − te ) back into the first equation yields:
te = φW

|Cef ′ | + Λ∗ |Cex′ |
f′
∗
x′
Q∗′
e + |Ce | + Λ |Ce |

+

f′
∗
x′
t∗e Q∗′
e − tf |Ce | − tx |Ce |
f′
∗
x′
Q∗′
e + |Ce | + Λ |Ce |

.

(17)

The first term on the right-hand side is the same as in (12) while the second term
is the value of the adjustment, ta , from (13).
To obtain a simpler and more intuitive result, suppose Foreign sets t∗x to avoid
distorting its consumption decisions (given the value of tx set by Home) so that
t∗x = tf − tx . As in Section 2.4 we define φ̃∗ = t∗e + t∗c , where t∗c = tf = tx + t∗x is
Foreign’s implicit consumption tax. Using this notation and the restriction on t∗x ,
we have tf = t∗c = φ̃∗ − t∗e and
t∗x = φ̃∗ − t∗e − (1 − Λ∗ )(φW − te ).
Substituting these two expressions into (17) we get:
te = t∗e + φW − φ̃∗



|Ce∗′ |
,
∗′
Q∗′
e + |Ce |

which is the expression for Home’s extraction tax in the first equation of (4). Since
tc = φW − te and t∗c = φ̃∗ − t∗e we get the second equation of (4) as well.
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D

Structure for Quantitative Illustrations

Our quantitative illustrations are from Kortum and Weisbach (2021), which
explicitly follows the Dornbusch, Fisher, and Samuelson (1977) Ricardian model
of trade with a unit continuum of goods (DFS). Here we show that our analysis
in this paper is fully compatible with that DFS structure. We also introduce the
functional forms that we impose for the quantitative results.
The relative efficiency of producing good j ∈ [0, 1] in Home is a∗j /aj = F (j),
where aj is Home’s total input requirement and a∗j is Foreign’s. The function F
is assumed to be continuous and strictly decreasing in j. For the quantitative
results, we parameterize the comparative advantage function as:

F (j) =

A 1−j
A∗ j

1/θ
,

where A and A∗ capture absolute advantage in goods production in Home and
Foreign while θ is the trade elasticity.
Producers combine inputs of labor and energy in a constant-returns-to-scale
production function to produce any good in any region. The wage is 1 and
the relevant after-tax energy price is p, which in Home is either pde (to serve
the domestic market) or pxe (to export). The associated unit cost function for
Home producers to supply good j is fj (p) = aj f (p). By Shepard’s lemma, the
unit energy requirement for good j is ej = aj f ′ (p). The same holds for Foreign
producers, with aj replaced by a∗j , taking account of the energy price they face, pfe
(to serve local consumers) or pm
e (for goods imported to Home). The quantitative
illustrations parameterize the comparative advantage function as f (p) = p1−α ,
where α is the labor share and 1 − α is the energy share in goods production.
Consider goods produced for the Home market (the argument will carry over in
an obvious way to the Foreign market). Effective prices of energy are pde = pe + td
and pm
e = pe + tm . At these after-tax prices, Home producers can supply good j
at cost aj f (pde ) while the cost to Foreign producers supplying Home is τ ∗ a∗j f (pm
e ).
∗
Here τ is the iceberg trade cost. Home consumers will purchase j from the
cheapest supplier. Thus they buy goods j ∈ [0, j̄m ) from domestic producers and
goods j ∈ (j̄m , 1] from Foreign producers. The threshold satisfies:
1 f (pde )
F (j̄m ) = ∗
,
τ f (pm
e )
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making Home consumers indifferent about where they buy good j̄m (since it costs
the same from either source). Consumers in Home, buying from the low-cost
supplier, face prices:
pj = aj f (pde )

j ≤ j̄m

τ ∗ a∗j f (pm
e )

j ≥ j̄m .

pj =

Kortum and Weisbach (2021) assume CES preferences over the unit continuum
of goods:
Z 1
σ/(σ−1)
(σ−1)/σ
Cg =
cj
dj
,
0

where σ is the demand elasticity. Welfare of a representative consumer in Home
is assumed to be:
U = Cs +


σ
η 1/σ Cg(σ−1)/σ − 1 − φE,
σ−1

where E is global carbon emissions. Facing prices pj , the utility maximizing
consumption of good j is cj = ηp−σ
j .
The price index Pg associated with Cg is:
Z
Pg =

1

p1−σ
dj
j

1
 1−σ

.

0

Expressed as a function of the after-tax prices of energy in Home and Foreign:
Pg (pde , pm
e ) =

Z

j̄m

1−σ
dj +
aj f (pde )

0

Z

1
! 1−σ

1

τ ∗ a∗j f (pm
e )

1−σ

dj

.

j̄m

The threshold j̄m is also a function of these after-tax prices of energy but, by the
envelope theorem, that doesn’t matter for the derivatives of Pg (since the cost of
sourcing the threshold good from Home or Foreign producers is the same). For
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example:
(Z
j̄m
∂Pg
1
σ
′ d
P
(1 − σ)p−σ
=
j aj f (pe )dj
∂pde
1−σ g
0
o


1−σ 
1−σ
d
)
∂
j̄
/∂p
− τ ∗ a∗j̄m f (pm
+ aj̄m f (pde )
m
e
e
Z j̄m
′ d
p−σ
= Pgσ
j aj f (pe )dj.
0

In Section 3 we express Home welfare in terms of indirect utility:
U = Y + ũ(pde , pm
e ) − φE.
Using the DFS structure, with CES preferences, we have:
ũ(pde , pm
e ) =

η
η 1/σ σ
−(σ−1)
Pg (pde , pm
−
,
e )
σ−1
σ−1

(18)

which is an explicit formula for the term in the objective (5). The derivations of
the results in Section 3 apply Roy’s identity:
∂ ũ/∂pde = ũ1 = −Ced
m
∂ ũ/∂pm
e = ũ2 = −Ce .

As a reality check, we can differentiate (18) to get:
ũ1 =

−ηPg−σ ∂Pg /∂pde

Z

j̄m

=−

aj f

′

(pde )ηp−σ
j dj

0

Z
=−

j̄m

ej cj dj = −Ced .

0

Roy’s identity is confirmed, in spite of j̄m governing the extensive margin of trade.
Energy embodied in Home consumption is:
Ce =

Ced

+

Cem

Z
=

j̄m

Z

0

Z
=

j̄m

aj f

′

1

τ ∗ e∗j cj dj

ej cj dj +

(pde )η

j̄m

−σ
aj f (pde )

Z

1

dj +

0

j̄m
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∗ ∗
m −σ
τ ∗ a∗j f ′ (pm
dj.
e )η τ aj f (pe )

Applying the functional form for f (p) we have:
f ′ (p)ηf (p)−σ = (1 − α)p−ϵD ,
where ϵD = α + (1 − α)σ is the energy demand elasticity. Substituting in this
functional form:
Ce = (1 − α)η

−ϵ
pde D

j̄m

Z

a1−σ
dj
j

+ (1 − α)η

−ϵD
(pm
e )

0

Z

1

τ ∗ a∗j

1−σ

dj.

j̄m

On the supply side, we restrict the cost functions for extraction to yield
constant supply elasticities. Hence, we take:
S +1)/ϵS
c(Qe ) = c × Q(ϵ
e
∗

∗

c∗ (Q∗e ) = c∗ × (Q∗e )(ϵS +1)/ϵS ,
where c and c∗ are constants, which are subsumed in calibrating to data on
extraction in each region, while ϵS and ϵ∗S are the energy supply elasticities.
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